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Abstract:  Internet  auction  platforms  are  changing  the  face  of  transactions  in  many 
business  sectors,  including  agriculture.    We  provide  one  of  the  first  systematic 
examinations of the differences between internet and in-person auctions in agricultural 
input  markets.    A  hedonic  model  estimated  with  used  tractor  transactions  from 
Midwestern  sellers  pooled  between  eBay  and  in-person  auctions  reveals  statistically 
distinct price surfaces for the two auction venues and predicts significantly lower prices 
for comparable equipment sold on eBay, though this difference is attenuated for tractors 
fully  covered  by  eBay’s  buyer  protection  program  and  is  fully  absent  for  the  most 
frequently  traded  tractor.    An  endogenous  venue-selection  model  reveals  that  larger, 
more-valuable tractors are less likely to be offered on eBay, a choice that should enhance 
seller revenues.  Furthermore, sellers in states with more valuable stocks of machinery, 
more frequent tractor sales, and a lower propensity to use the internet for agricultural 
marketing are more likely to offer tractors for sale via in-person auctions than on eBay. 
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   1 
Few  sounds  capture  the  rhythm  of  agricultural  economies  better  than  the  syncopated 
cadence of an auctioneer echoing across a clutch of farmers gathered around the auction 
block.    This  seemingly  timeless  portrait  of  economic  exchange  in  rural  America  has 
changed however, as advances in technology alter the way auctions are conducted.  The 
advent of telephone bidding, video links and, more recently, internet bidding platforms 
change the nature of auctions by broadening the pool of potential sellers and bidders.  As 
the commercial success of eBay and other internet auctions sites suggest, the internet 
provides  many  possible  advantages  over  in-person  auctions.    Internet  auction  sites 
provide extensive listings and powerful search technologies, which can contribute to the 
creation  of  liquid  markets  for  specialized  product  categories,  even  when  buyers  and 
sellers are geographically dispersed.  This is particularly important for U.S. agriculture 
because,  as  production  becomes  increasingly  concentrated  among  fewer  entities,  the 
number of potential bidders in a given radius of any sales location diminishes.  
A  key  strength  of  the  internet  –  the  pooling  of  bidders  from  geographically 
dispersed locations – can also be a weakness, as distance removes a critical advantage of 
in-person auctions, i.e., bidders directly inspecting merchandise.  While some internet 
sites that hold agricultural equipment auctions attempt to directly offset this weakness by 
providing  inspection  services  (e.g.,  IronPlanet.com),  the  most  widely  used  internet 
auction site, eBay, does not provide such direct ex ante risk mitigation services.  Other ex 
ante risk mitigation instruments are available to eBay buyers, however, including the 
posting of reliability ratings of individual sellers and the use of photos and videos that 
allow buyers to inspect aspects of goods from a distance.  Starting in June of 2005, eBay 
also began offering ex post risk mitigation service to business equipment purchasers in   2 
the form of a fraud protection policy that refunds a buyer’s outlays up to $20,000 for 
business equipment (including farm equipment) sold by eBay sellers in the case of seller 
fraud or undisclosed equipment defects. 
As  online  sales  of  farm  equipment  become  more  widespread,  questions  arise 
about the nature of price determination in online versus traditional markets.  We present 
empirical evidence from recent Midwest auctions for used farm tractors conducted on 
eBay and via in-person auctions.  We are interested in several questions.  Do eBay and 
in-person auctions  yield similar average prices for comparable equipment and similar 
hedonic surfaces for used farm tractors?  Second, what influences whether tractors are 
offered  for  sale  on  eBay  versus  in-person  auctions?    Finally  we  ask  if  sellers 
systematically direct tractors to the outlet that provides the highest sales revenue. 
Characteristics of eBay and in-person tractor auctions  
To better understand if eBay and traditional auctions assign similar values to used 
tractors  and  why  sellers  may  prefer  one  outlet  to  another,  we  first  discuss  how  the 
characteristics of eBay auctions differ from in-person auctions.  The auctions differ in 
three fundamental ways: the mode of participant interaction (internet versus in person), 
the auction mechanism, and the role of the marketing agent.  The ‘traditional’ in-person 
auction considered in this study is an ascending-bid, open-outcry, first-price (English) 
auction executed by an auctioneer, while eBay employs a format that is similar, but not 
identical, to a second-price sealed-bid (Vickery) auction executed by eBay.
1  
Auctions mechanisms are differentiated in several domains: ascending versus 
descending, first-price versus second-price, and sealed versus open.  Both eBay and in-
person tractor auctions are ascending auctions, i.e., prices begin low and rise with   3 
additional bidding.  In-person tractor auctions are typically first-price auctions, where the 
highest bidder pays a price equal to the highest bid to secure the tractor, while eBay 
auctions are similar to a second-price auction, i.e., the winner pays the price bid by the 
second-highest bidder plus a small, additional increment.
2   
In-person tractor auctions are typically open outcry auctions, where bidders are 
aware of the number of other bidders and the highest bid at any point in the auction.  In 
contrast, eBay auctions reveal only the ‘current bid’, i.e., the second highest bid plus a 
small increment.  Each eBay bidder typically bids via proxy, i.e., enters a maximum bid 
and allows eBay’s system to automatically bid for the buyer as needed up to the 
maximum bid.  If each buyer were to forgo additional bids and not monitor the progress 
of the on-line auction, then eBay auctions would be identical to a second-price sealed-bid 
auction.  In practice, many bidders do monitor bidding activity and often enter additional 
bids, including many bids during the final moments of fixed-duration eBay auctions. 
Under certain assumptions, including the risk-neutrality of buyers, most auctions, 
including the in-person and eBay tractor auction mechanisms considered here, will yield 
the same price for a given good (see Klemperer 1999 for an overview of Vickery’s 
original ‘revenue equivalence theorem’ and several recent generalizations).  Hence, in a 
setting where a pool of tractors and a pool of risk-neutral buyers are both randomly 
assigned to eBay and in-person auctions, the absolute price for any tractor should be 
equivalent whether offered under the in-person or eBay format.  Furthermore, as each 
tractor would fetch the same price in either outlet, the resulting hedonic price surface 
should be the same for each outlet.  In reality, however, buyers may not be risk averse,   4 
buyers are not randomly assigned to participate in eBay and in-person auctions, and 
sellers are unlikely to randomly assign tractors between the two auction outlets. 
The presence of risk-averse buyers is one reason why the two auction formats 
may yield different prices.  In a first-price auction, a risk-averse buyer will submit a 
higher bid than a risk neutral buyer with the same willingness to pay because a risk-
averse buyer is willing to submit a higher bid in order to increase the likelihood of 
winning at the expense of lower surplus (Klemperer 1999).  Klemperer (1999) shows that 
risk aversion has no effect on a buyer’s bid in a second-price auction.  If tractor bidders 
tend to be risk averse, then we might expect in-person auctions to yield higher prices.   
Furthermore, if buyers are heterogeneous with regard to risk aversion, one might 
expect in-person auctions to attract those with higher risk aversion because in-person 
auctions allow the mitigation of risk associated with tractor quality via personal 
inspection of sale items and the mitigation of transactions risk by dealing with bonded 
auctioneers.  This self-selection of risk-averse buyers to in-person auctions would 
exacerbate the likelihood that in-person auction prices will be higher than eBay prices.   
Just as the pool of buyers for eBay and in-person tractor auctions may not be 
identical, so the quality of the pool of available tractors may differ between the two 
outlets.  Though there exists no systematic evaluation of the quality of eBay and in-
person auction tractors, buyers may be more suspicious of eBay items due to their 
inability to personally inspect sale items.  Similarly, a seller would be less likely to offer 
a tractor with a quality defect at an in-person auction because many experienced 
individuals will likely inspect the item.  This suggests these adverse selection pressures 
may induce lower bids for items sold on eBay.     5 
eBay has introduced several measures in an attempt to reduce the possible effect 
of  adverse  selection  on  sale  prices.    First,  it  has  pioneered  the  development  and 
maintenance of an online trading partners feedback forum (Cohen 2002) where market 
participants  continuously  assess  their  trading  partners  performance  with  regard  to 
payment speed and merchandise quality.  This reduces the search costs for information 
about the reputation of market participants.
3 The feedback mechanism allows buyer and 
seller  to  leave  publicly  available  comments  about  each  other.    A  rapidly  growing 
empirical  literature  that  uses  data  from  the  feedback  mechanism  of  online  auctions 
attempts  to  quantify  the  market  value  of  online  reputations  (see  Bajari  and  Hortaçsu 
2004; Dewan and Hsu 2004; Houser and Wooders 2006). 
Second,  in  June  2005,  eBay  introduced  its  “Business  Equipment  Purchase 
Protection Program” that covers undisclosed damages or deliberate seller fraud.  Any 
items  sold  in  the  business  and  industrial  capital  equipment  category,  which  includes 
tractors, that sell for $1,000 to $20,000 are automatically enrolled in the program.   
The fact that eBay auctions have a fixed-time format may also cause differences 
in the price generated between the two tractor auction formats.  Specifically, astute eBay 
bidders often wait until the final moments of an auction before entering their bids in order 
to mute potential bidding wars with inexperienced or emotional bidders or to avoid 
revealing their personal valuation for the good being auctioned (Roth and Ockenfels 
2002).  Hence, the fixed time format may shade eBay prices lower than in-person tractor 
auctions where bidding continues until only one bidder remains.  
Research into the relative pricing performance of eBay and in-person auctions is 
particularly important as the two venues feature vastly different commission levels.  eBay   6 
commissions for business and industrial capital equipment sales are one percent of the 
final  sale  price  with  a  maximum  charge  of  $250,  a  $20  listing  fee,  and  a  variety  of 
optional fixed-fee listing enhancements (e.g., bold lettering).  
In-person auctions feature commissions that typically range from 2.5 percent to 
15 percent, often with no limit on the maximum total commission paid.  To the best of 
our knowledge, detailed information concerning the average commission structures for 
U.S. farm equipment auctions is not available, though industry sources suggest that the 
bulk of commissions fall in the five to ten percent range (Musser, 2006).  As a point of 
reference,  we  list  the  commission  structure  of  an  internet-based  auction  house, 
IronPlanet.com, which provides features similar to that of an in-person auction company, 
including  equipment  inspection  and  lien  searches.    This  firm  features  a  block-rate 
commission structure outlined in table 1.  The difference between the total commissions 
paid for various sales prices can vary dramatically; the difference for a $1,000 item is 
about $100 and the difference for a $100,000 item is more than $6,000.    
Finally, note that the auctioneers organizing and running the in-person sales are 
exclusive agents of the seller and charge larger commissions than eBay, which focuses on 
providing a robust marketplace for buyers and sellers.  Do to these differences in legal 
status and reliance on higher commissions, the incentives to stimulate bidding and higher 
sales prices may be stronger for in-person auctions.     
Data 
We use data from internet and in-person tractor auctions conducted between June 1, 2005 
and March 31, 2006 in 11 Midwestern states (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, NE, ND, OH, SD, 
WI).  The internet sample was purchased through eBay’s service provider program.  The   7 
acquired data license included detailed and complete information about auctions that took 
place in eBay’s “Tractor and Farm Machinery” category, including the final sales price, 
make, model, engine horsepower, year, hours of use, auction date, seller zip code, and 
other information describing the auction items and the nature of the auction.  The in-
person  auction  data  was  purchased  from  Machinery  Pete’s  Farm  Equipment  FACT’s 
Report,  which  summarizes  results  from  retirement,  estate,  dealer  and  consignment 
auctions  reported  by  a  network  of  more  than  600  auctioneers.    Provided  information 
includes sales price, make, model, engine horsepower, year, hours of use, auction date 
and location (region within a state), and other descriptive information.  The data do not 
represent  the  entire  universe  of  used  tractor  transactions  for  the  Midwest  during  this 
period, as other internet auction sites regularly transact tractors and some auctioneers 
may not report to the FACT’s Report, but this likely represents a wide, representative 
sample from the universe of used tractors. 
Several filters were applied to each data set to arrive at a sample used for analysis.  
For both samples, tractors with model years earlier than 1960 were excluded to focus on 
tractors that were most likely purchased for operational rather than collectible purposes.  
Also tractors of 30 horsepower and less were excluded to focus on tractors most likely to 
be  used  in  agriculture  rather  than  nursery  or  landscape  operations.    Items  that  were 
classified by the seller as “for parts” or “not running” and items that were sold with 
expensive  additional  implements  such  as  backhoes  were  excluded.    Items  with  less 
expensive implements such as loaders or mowers were included.  Finally, the data set was 
also limited to the 13 manufacturers (makes) that contributed more than 89 percent of   8 
sample observations.  The complete data set (see table 2 for summary statistics) included 
588 eBay observations and 1,770 in-person observations for a total of 2,358.   
Modeling and Analysis 
We are interested in understanding if the two auction venues are different from either the 
buyer’s  or  the  seller’s  point  of  view.    To  assess  this  empirically  we  estimate  an 
endogenous switching regression model (Maddala 1983, chapter 8), which consists of 
two  key  modeling  components.    In  the  first  stage  we  model  the  seller’s  decision 
concerning the sales venue for a particular tractor: 
(1)   Si
* = δ([ln(Pi1) – ci1] – [ln(Pi0) – ci0]) + γZi + ui  ≡ αAi + ui,  
where Pi1 (Pi0) is the price tractor i would earn if sold on eBay (in person), ci1 (ci0) is the 
financial cost of selling a tractor on eBay (in person), δ is a parameter to be estimated, Zi 
is a column vector of other factors that might influence the seller’s choice of sale venue 
for  tractor  i,  γ  is  a  row  vector  of  parameters  to  be  estimated,  ui  is  an  unobserved 
component driving venue selection, α is a row vector containing δ and γ, and Ai is a 
column vector containing [ln(Pi1) – ci1] – [ln(Pi0) – ci0] and Zi .  If Si
*
 ≥ 0 the tractor is 
sold on eBay (Si = 1); otherwise it is sold at an in-person auction (Si = 0). 
  After selecting a venue, each tractor is then sold for a price, which is represented 
by a venue-specific hedonic equation: 
(2)  ln(Pi) = k0 + ß0xi + u0i,  if Si = 0 (tractor sold in person)  
or 
(3)  ln(Pi) = k1 + ß1xi + u1i,  if Si = 1 (tractor sold on eBay), 
where kj is the price intercept for venue j, xi is a column vector of attributes of tractor i; ßj 
is a row vector of marginal implicit prices for each attribute in venue j, and uji represents   9 
unobserved factors that drive the price for tractor i in venue j.  Hedonic pricing analysis is 
commonly  used  for  the  study  of  markets  with  differentiated  goods  (Lancaster  1971; 
Rosen 1974).  Hedonic models assume that the price of good is a function of the value of 
its individual attributes.  If robust markets exist, each attribute will have a well-defined 
shadow price (the individual elements of βj) and the price (or logarithm of price) of the 
good is a function (a mere summation in our case) of these shadow prices.  
  We must also consider that the unobserved factors driving venue selection (ui) 
may be correlated with the unobserved factors driving price (uji) via covariance factors 
σju.  If this is the case, estimates of (2) and (3) will yield inconsistent estimates of the 
shadow values of tractor attributes in each venue as each specification fails to account for 
unobserved factors that drove its placement into that market.  Consistent estimates may 
be generated by estimating: 
(4)  ln(Pi) = k0 + ß0xi + σ0uW0i + e0i,  if Si = 0 (tractor sold in person)  
and  
(5)  ln(Pi) = k1 + ß1xi – σ1uW1i + e1i,  if Si = 1 (tractor sold on eBay), 
or by estimating 
(6)  ln(Pi) = k0 + ß0xi + Si[k1 –  k0 + (ß1 – ß0)xi – σ1uW1i] + (1 – Si) σ0uW0i + ei, 
where W1i = φ(α
*Ai)/Φ(α
*Ai), W0i = φ(α
*Ai)/[1 – Φ(α
*Ai)], φ(●) is the standard normal 
density  function, Φ(●) is the standard normal distribution function, α
* is a consistent 
estimate of α, and the ei’s are the new residuals with zero conditional means (e.g., ei = uji 
+  σjuWji).    The  structure  of  ei  implies  these  residuals  will  be  heteroscedastic.  
Furthermore, the residuals may contain additional structure because, in the case of eBay 
sales, we identify that some tractors are offered by the same seller and, in the case of in-  10 
person auctions, we identify that some tractors are offered at the same auction event.  
One might imagine that final auction prices will be driven by unobservable factors that 
are constant across all tractors sold by the same eBay seller (due to reputation, location) 
and all tractors sold at the same event (due to weather, reputation of auctioneer, pool of 
bidders).  Hence, the use of a panel estimator may improve the estimate’s efficiency.
4   
Our empirical strategy is to (a) use maximum likelihood estimation to obtain α
*, a 
consistent  estimate  for  α  from  the  reduced-form  version
5  of  equation  (1),  to  develop 
consistent  estimates  of  Φi  and  φi;  (b)  estimate  equation  (6)  with  a  generalized  least 
squares random effects estimator
6 after substituting in consistent estimates Φi
* and φi
*; 
and (c) use maximum likelihood to re-estimate equation (1) after substituting in predicted 
prices
7 generated from estimated parameters obtained in step (c).  The standard errors are 
clustered on the seller-specific or event-specific identification for each of these steps.  In 
addition, for steps (b) and (c), we use a jackknife procedure to develop standard errors 
that are robust to the heteroscedasticity of these residuals. 
Step (a) is the necessary first-stage reduced-form regression to determine venue 
selection.    Step  (b)  affords  us  a  clean  opportunity  to  test  for  structural  differences 
between the intercepts and shadow prices in the hedonic models for tractors in each sales 
venue.
8    Step  (c)  is  the  structural  version  of  step  (a);  i.e.,  it  allows  us  to  revisit  the 
selection equation in a manner that clearly identifies the relative importance of price and 
non-price elements in the seller’s venue selection decision. 
Results 
The  estimated  coefficients  for  the  fully  interacted  hedonic  model  (equation  6)  are 
presented in the first two columns of table 3.  The first column provides the estimated   11 
coefficients for attributes as determined via in-person auctions while the second column 
lists the estimates for the eBay interaction terms.  The model fits the data well (overall R
2 
of 0.86).  Alternative functional forms (e.g., log-log formulations for continuous variables 
such as hours and age) provide no better fit to the data than the current log-quadratic 
form.  The correlation of error terms across individual sellers is quite large (ρ = 0.42). 
  An  F-test  of  the  joint  significance  of  all  eBay  interaction  terms  is  highly 
significant (F = 5.54, p < 0.001), suggesting that the two venues yield distinct hedonic 
price models.  Omitting the intercept term from this test, which is highly significant on its 
own, still yields a highly significant test statistic (F = 4.44, p < 0.001).  Taken together, 
these tests suggest that sales on eBay result in both a significant, negative shift in base 
price and a significantly different set of attribute shadow prices. 
When separate regressions are performed for the eBay and in-person auction data 
(appendix), we also find that the in-person hedonic model fits the data better than does 
the eBay model (R
2 = 0.87 versus 0.71).  This may suggest that in-person auctions offer 
the seller more confidence in the range of prices that will be received for a particular 
model of tractor with a given set of attributes, while eBay auctions may yield greater 
variability in the eventual sale price.  Furthermore, the separate regressions indicate a 
much larger random effects correlation coefficient for the eBay auctions (ρ = 0.71 versus 
0.14).  This is not too surprising given that the unit of observation for eBay sales is the 
individual  seller  while  for  in-person  auctions  it  is  the  auction  event.    One  might 
hypothesize that there will be greater correlation among unobservable components when 
repeat  sales  emanate  from  the  same  individual  seller,  particularly  given  the  seller   12 
reputation information provided by eBay.  Individual auctions may aggregate tractors 
from many sellers with the only common elements being time, location and auctioneer.  
To more precisely identify the source of differences between the two venues, one 
can inspect individual eBay interaction terms and test particular subsets of these terms.  
Several individual interaction terms are significantly different from zero and several joint 
tests for categorical classifications are significant.   
The first notable result is that the eBay intercept interaction term is negative and 
significant, i.e., controlling for all attributes and for the fact that attributes may be valued 
differently in each venue, the fact that the item is sold on eBay means a lower selling 
price.  The magnitude of this coefficient is quite large: eBay sales generate 27 cents on 
the dollar compared to in-person auctions.  While representing a substantial discount, the 
coefficient cannot be interpreted separately from the other eBay interaction terms.  That 
is, 27 cents on the dollar is the base discount for tractors sold on eBay.  We show that 
other key attributes are valued more highly in the eBay market and will offset, to some 
extent, this base discount.  To fully explore the overall influence of the interaction term, 
we  later  predict  venue-specific  prices  for  each  tractor,  and  these  predictions  take  all 
interaction terms into consideration.  In general we find the other eBay interaction terms 
attenuate the substantial discount represented by the eBay intercept interaction term. 
  Several attribute-specific differences are apparent after studying the interaction 
terms.  For example, tractors with attached implements fetch a 20 percent higher value on 
eBay (t = 2.71, p = 0.007) while tractors sold on a weekend generate 11 percent less on 
eBay (t = -1.97, p = 0.05).  There also exist some seasonal differences between in-person 
and  eBay  price  patterns;  specifically,  eBay  features  marginally  lower  sales  prices  in   13 
January and higher sales prices in June than in-person auctions.  As a group, however, the 
month dummy eBay interaction terms are insignificant (F = 1.37, p = 0.20).  In-person 
auctions tend to further discount older tractors compared to eBay (F = 14.85, p < 0.001, 
see figure 1).  Also, eBay sales value horse power in a marginally different fashion than 
in-person auctions (F = 2.65, p = 0.07), with eBay marginal values being higher over the 
relevant ranges of horse power (see figure 1).   
  The two venues appear to place similar marginal values on many attributes.  For 
example, the joint tests of significance for the interaction terms involving the different 
transmission features (four-wheel drive, t = -0.78, p = 0.44 and manual transmission, t = 
0.76, p = 0.45), type of engine (gas vs. diesel, t = -0.75, p = 0.45), hours of use (F = 0.45, 
p = 0.64), and makes (F = 0.65, p = 0.80) reveal no significant differences. 
  One  distinction  between  in-person  and  eBay  auctions  is  that  fraud  and 
misrepresentation is more easily avoided with in-person auctions because the buyer is 
normally present to inspect the item and because many auctioneers provide inspection 
services.  This could lead to a significant decline in prices for goods traded on eBay and 
could hinder the growth of sales volume.  Indeed, the eBay interaction term with the 
intercept in the model just discussed was highly negative, suggesting that base prices 
were considerably lower on eBay compared to in-person auctions.   
To combat this issue and to improve buyer confidence, eBay offers a free buyer 
protection program that reimburses buyers up to $20,000 for transactions that feature 
seller fraud or undisclosed product defects.  In order to investigate the possible effects of 
such a program on the eBay market, we re-estimate the models using a sub-sample of   14 
observations for which the final sales price is $20,000 or less.  The results are presented 
in the first and second columns of table 4. 
The first thing to notice about the results from this restricted sample is that the 
eBay intercept interaction term is 57 percent smaller than when using the full sample (-
0.745 versus -1.313).  This translates to an eBay price that is roughly 47 cents for every 
dollar received from an in-person auction, which is considerably better than the $0.27 
figure from the full-sample model.  This suggests that, for used tractors that tend to sell 
for less than $20,000, the base discount for selling on eBay is smaller.  Like the model 
featuring  all  observations,  the  model  of  the  restricted  sample  reveals  significantly 
different hedonic surfaces for the two auction venues.  While the joint test that all eBay 
interaction terms are equal to zero is soundly rejected (F = 3.87, p < 0.001), the test 
statistic is 30 percent smaller than the comparable statistic for the full sample.  Taken 
together, these two pieces of evidence provide some indirect evidence that eBay’s buyer 
protection program may be providing the desired effect and driving prices from eBay and 
in-person auctions to have more similar hedonic surfaces, though clearly these results 
suggest substantial differences remain. 
Another  more  straightforward  way  to  verify  if  the  two  auction  venues  are 
generating similar prices is to simply compare the distributions of price for a single used 
tractor model that is frequently sold in both outlets.  The most commonly sold used 
tractor in this data set is the John Deere 4020.  More than 57,000 units of this tractor were 
produced by John Deere at its Waterloo, Iowa, factory between 1963 and 1971, making it 
one of the most common models ever produced in U.S. agriculture.  Our data set includes 
the sales price of 83 units, including 23 sold via eBay.  Tests fail to reject that the two   15 
sub-samples of tractors are identical with respect to age (t = 0.97, p=0.33; Kruskal-Wallis 
[K-W] χ
2(1) = 1.21, p=0.27), hours (t = 0.67, p=0.51; K-W χ
2(1) = 0.88, p=0.25), the 
inclusion of ancillary implements (Pearson’s χ
2(1) = 0.16, p=0.69), and reliance upon 
diesel  fuel  (some  in  each  sub-sample  feature  gas  engines,  Pearson’s  χ
2(1)  =  0.86, 
p=0.36).  By design all John Deere 4020’s had the same horsepower, though a chi-square 
test rejects that both venues sold the same percent of 4020’s with manual transmission 
(about 13 percent of eBay 4020’s feature manual transmission while none in in-person 
auctions  lists  this  feature,  Pearson’s  χ
2(1)  =  8.12,  p=0.004).
9    Hence,  other  than  the 
difference in transmission types, eBay and in-person offerings of the 4020 appear to quite 
similar with regard to the attributes used in the hedonic model.   
Figure 2 is the box plot of the sales price distributions for each venue, where the 
top (bottom) of the box represents the 75
th (25
th) percentile value, the solid horizontal line 
across each box is the median, and the ‘whiskers’ represent the largest observed values in 
either direction within the inner fence.
10  Dots appearing outside the whiskers represent 
potential outliers within the distribution.  The mean in-person auction price ($8,212.50) is 
quite close to that of the eBay sample ($8,166.37).  Both a t-test (t = 0.06, p = 0.95) and 
the non-parametric K-W test (χ
2(1) = 0.08, p = 0.77) fail to reject the equivalency of sales 
price between the two sub-samples.  Hence, in-person and eBay auctions provide similar 
price distributions for the John Deere 4020’s sold in the Midwest during this time frame.  
This provides some additional evidence of convergence in average sales prices for used 
tractors that sell for less than the upper limit of eBay’s consumer protection policy,
11 
though a rigorous test of the effect of the policy eludes us due to a lack of data that 
precedes the beginning of eBay’s buyer protection program.   16 
Predicted Prices, Sales Revenue and Equalizing Commissions 
We  have  identified  that  separate  hedonic  surfaces  emerge  in  different  auction 
venues, and that the difference between the venues may be attenuated for tractors that sell 
in a price range covered by eBay’s buyer protection program.  The hedonic models use 
sale price as the dependent variable, while sellers are more likely to be interested in the 
sales revenue they keep rather than the price that sales generate.  In other words, sellers 
care both about the price generated at sale and the costs of transacting the sale (e.g., 
commissions, fees and other costs).  To explore this aspect we predict both the in-person 
and eBay auction price of all used tractors using the models from the full and restricted 
samples.  The average and median prices for all tractors in each data sample, as well as 
for six specific models, are listed in table 5.   
In addition to predicting prices  for sales in  each venue, we also  calculate the 
difference in the seller’s net revenues between the two outlets.  To calculate this we first 
take the predicted in-person sales price and apply the commission structure in table 1, 
including the average fees listed in the footnotes to table 1.  Next, we subtract this from 
the predicted eBay sales price less commission (the minimum of one percent of sales 
value and $250) and typical fees ($20 listing fee plus $55 in optional advertising fees).  
This difference is listed in column 3 of table 5.  The fourth column presents the flat 
commission fee that would need to be assessed to the in-person auction to equate net 
revenue from selling the tractor in the two venues under the assumption that the fixed 
fees for in-person and eBay venues remain at $450 and $75.  Note if the eBay price less 
fixed fees is higher than that for the in-person auction, only a subsidy for selling at the in-
person auction would equate the net revenue.  For these cases column four lists ‘NA’.   17 
The top half of table 5 features predictions from the model for used tractors of all 
prices and provides three examples of tractors for which the range of in-person sales price 
exceeds $20,000.  For each example model and for the average and median of all tractors, 
in-person  auctions  generate  greater  net  revenues  than  eBay  sales  under  the  assumed 
commission structure.  For example, the average across all tractors in the sample results 
in eBay revenue that is $9,795 less than the in-person auction revenues.  The size of the 
flat commission necessary to equate net revenue between the two venues is 55.2 percent.  
The  range  of  commissions  observed  for  in-person  auctions  rarely  exceed  15  percent, 
suggesting that net revenues generated for used tractor sellers on eBay are substantially 
lower, particularly for the higher-price models explored in the top half of the table.   
The bottom half of table 5 utilizes the hedonic model based on tractors that sold 
for less than $20,000.  When all tractors in this sub-sample are considered, the average 
difference in net revenues generated by the two auction venues is much smaller, with an 
advantage  of  $872  for  in-person  auctions.    It  would  only  take  an  29.2  percent  flat 
commission rate to equate the net revenue generated by the two sources, a rate lower than 
those observed in the top half of the table, but considerably higher than those observed in 
in-person auctions.  Also note that our commission and fees calculations do not adjust for 
one fundamental difference in costs, i.e., that eBay tractors do not need to be transported 
to a central sale location.  Information concerning the distance between a seller’s home 
and the location of in-person sales was not available.  The additional transportation cost 
is unlikely to alter the sign of the net revenue difference for either the average or median 
tractor in the full sample, but it may have a larger relative influence for the lesser-valued 
tractors in the bottom half of table 5.   18 
Auction Venue Selection  
  The hedonic analysis suggests that the two auction outlets feature distinct price 
intercepts and surfaces while the analysis of predicted sales revenues suggests that, for 
many  tractor  models,  the  net  revenues  will  be  substantially  larger  in  one  outlet  than 
another.  If this were the case, and if market participants were well informed of these 
patterns,  sellers  may  steer
12  tractors  with  certain  attributes  towards  the  market  that 
generates higher value.  To investigate this we now discuss our estimates of the reduced-
form  and  structural  versions  of  the  venue  selection  model.    The  estimated  probit 
coefficients for the reduced-form model, along with robust standard errors, are presented 
in tables 3 and 4 for the full sample and for the sample of tractors that sold for less than 
$20,000.  The structural selection models appear in table 6.     
If  sellers  are  motivated  by  maximizing  sale  price  and  are  fully  aware  of  the 
different hedonic surfaces of the two markets, one would hypothesize that the reduced-
form selection model coefficients would agree in sign and significance with the eBay 
interaction terms from the hedonic price model.  That is, if the attribute features a larger 
shadow price on eBay, you would expect tractors with that attribute to be sold on eBay.   
In both the full-sample and restricted sample models, however, many coefficients 
fail to agree in sign and significance with the eBay interaction terms in the analogous 
hedonic model.  For example, in the full-sample reduced-form selection model (table 3, 
column  3),  the  coefficient  for  Manual  is  negative  and  significant  while  the  eBay 
interaction  term  in  the  hedonic  price  model  (table  3,  column  2)  is  positive  though 
insignificant.  All else equal a used tractor with a manual transmission sells for no less on 
eBay.  However, all else equal, a used tractor with a manual transmission is less likely to   19 
be  offered  for  sale  on  eBay.    This  lack  of  agreement  holds  for  numerous  attributes, 
including for four makes and three sale months.  The quadratic terms in the probit for 
Hours and Horse also feature distinctly different curvatures.  Similar divergences hold 
for the model estimated with the restricted sample. 
Two variables featured in the reduced-form selection model are excluded from the 
hedonic  models  for  the  purposes  of  adequately  identifying  the  endogenous  switching 
regression  model  –  each  of  these  variables  is  highly  significant  in  both  the  full  and 
restricted  samples.    First,  as  a  state’s  average  per-farm  value  for  machinery  and 
equipment
13 increases, sellers from that state are less likely to offer their tractors on eBay.  
This may suggest that adequate in-person secondary markets exist in states where farms 
carry highly valued inventories of machinery and equipment.  States where farms hold 
lower-valued  inventories  of  machinery  and  equipment  may  feature  thinner  in-person 
secondary  markets  and  rely  more  heavily  upon  electronic  markets  to  transact  used 
tractors.  A similar argument may hold for the StateSale variable, which is calculated as 
the  number  of  tractors  in  the  current  data  set  from  a  particular  state  divided  by  the 
number of total tractors (in thousands) held in inventory in that state.  The greater is the 
volume of transactions in our data set from a particular state as  a fraction of all the 
tractors held in that state, the less likely it is that the tractor is offered on eBay.  Again, 
states  with  larger  volumes  of  tractors  offered  for  sale  may  stimulate  more  in-person 
auction possibilities, which would limit offerings on eBay. 
Revenue Maximization and Venue Selection 
We now revisit the issue of whether sellers are choosing the sales venue that will 
maximize net sales revenue.  One test of the precept of net revenue maximization is   20 
presented in table 5, where we predict the probability that the six example tractors used in 
the previous section are offered on eBay using the results of the reduced-form venue-
selection model reported in table 3.  If sellers are efficiently allocating different tractors 
between the two venues, we would expect the predicted probability of offer on eBay to 
reflect the difference in predicted net revenues.  For the three more expensive tractors 
(top half of table 5), each is predicted to fetch higher prices and net revenue from in-
person auctions.  The predicted probability of sale on eBay for each is also quite low.   
To explore this more thoroughly, we report the structural venue-selection probit 
model in table 6, where an eBay sale is the dependent variable and the difference in net 
revenues  predicted  from  the  hedonic  regression  results  and  subsequent  calculations 
involving  commissions,  expressed  in  thousands  of  dollars,  is  one  of  the  independent 
variables.  The difference in net revenues is highly significant (t = 8.36, p < 0.001), which 
suggests that sellers target tractors to the venue that will fetch the greatest revenue.  The 
marginal effect of a change in expected net revenue is modest, however, with the change 
in probability of a sale to eBay changing by less than one percent for an incremental 
change  in  predicted  net  revenue.    The  additional  identifying  regressors  used  in  the 
reduced-form selection model continue to hold their same sign and significance in the 
structural model, i.e., greater machinery values and greater sales volume in the state of 
sale  depress  the  likelihood  of  an  eBay  sale.    An  additional  regressor,  which  was 
insignificant  in  initial  reduced-form  estimations  and  excluded  from  the  reduced-form 
model reported in tables 3 and 4, is the proportion of farmers in the state of sale that 
report using the internet for agricultural marketing purposes.  For the full sample, this 
variable is a positive and significant predictor of eBay sales.  That is, for states in which a   21 
greater  portion  of  farmers  use  the  internet  for  agricultural  marketing,  this  propensity 
appears to spill over to capital equipment marketing.   
For the less expensive tractors explored in the lower half of table 5, where prices 
and net revenues are predicted using the restricted sample model, the predicted reduced-
form probabilities do not reflect uniformly the difference in predicted revenues.   For 
example, the sale of the Versatile-make tractor on eBay is predicted to generate more in 
net revenue than would a traditional auction.  However, the reduced-form venue-selection 
model only places the probability of an eBay sale at two percent.  The other two sample 
tractors in the bottom half of table 5 do predict that the tractors will be offered in the 
venue with the highest predicted net revenue. 
When  we  repeat  the  structural  probit  estimation  for  this  sub-sample  (table  6, 
column 2), we also find the difference in predicted revenues is positive and significant (t 
= 7.15, p < 0.001).  In other words, it appears that, for the sub-sample of tractors selling 
for less than $20,000, sellers are systematically directing tractors to be sold in the outlet 
that is predicted to yield higher net sales receipts.  Furthermore, the marginal effect of the 
difference in revenues is much larger in this sample of lesser-valued tractors (4.4 percent 
versus 0.6 percent).  The signs and marginal effects of the other venue selection variables 
are similar between the two samples, though the internet marketing variable in the sample 
of lesser-valued tractors fails to be statistically significant. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Markets  for  durable  and  non-durable  agricultural  inputs  are  being  altered  by  the 
emergence of internet-based trading venues.  We explore differences between internet 
and traditional markets for used tractors by estimating an endogenous switching model in   22 
which the second-stage estimates are hedonic price models fit to data from eBay and in-
person auctions.  We find the eBay and in-person auctions yield distinct hedonic price 
surfaces and that the average price received in eBay auctions is substantially lower than 
that received in in-person auctions.   
Several  possible  explanations  exist  for  this  divergence.    First,  the  first-price 
auction mechanism used at in-person auctions is known to generate higher prices than the 
second-price mechanism used by eBay if buyers are risk averse.  Risk-averse buyers may 
self-select to in-person auctions because they can personally inspect items and deal with 
licensed and bonded auctioneers.  Without data on the characteristics of buyers at each 
auction venue, however, we cannot test this hypothesis.  Second, buyers may suspect 
adverse selection and shade bids for eBay items lower.  eBay buyers are protected from 
seller fraud and misrepresentation for items that sell for less than $20,000 and, if adverse 
selection were an issue, we would expect to find greater equivalency between eBay and 
in-person bids for tractors that sell in this price range.  Indeed, we find the percentage 
discount for eBay tractors is substantially smaller for items that sell for less than $20,000.  
In fact, for the most frequently traded model in our data set, which normally sells for 
prices well below the $20,000 threshold, the distribution of prices obtained in eBay and 
in-person  auctions  is  no  different.    However,  without  eBay  data  that  precedes  the 
implementation of this eBay buyer protection policy, we cannot definitively say that it is 
the buyer protection policy that causes this greater price equivalency, nor draw solid 
conclusions that adverse selection is driving the underlying divergence in prices between 
the  two  venues.    Hence,  substantial  work  remains  to  unravel  the  explanation  for  the 
substantial eBay used tractor discount we uncover in our data.   23 
  From a strategic point of view, the presence of an eBay discount suggests that, 
from the buyer’s point of view, purchasing newer, more powerful tractors on eBay may 
offer the opportunity to source key machinery at a discount compared to traditional in-
person auctions.  However, these buyers must  bear  additional risk both because they 
cannot  personally  inspect  the  merchandise  and  because  occurrences  of  fraud  or 
misrepresentation cannot be fully covered under existing eBay ex-post risk protection 
programs.  Indeed the hedonic equation for eBay auctions features greater price variation.  
Indirect  evidence,  in  the  form  of  highly  correlated  within-seller  error  terms  from  the 
random-effects  regression  of  an  eBay-only  sample  (ρ  =  0.69),  suggests  that  ex-ante 
reputational  devices  such  as  eBay’s  seller  rating  mechanism  provide  important 
information that is valued by buyers. 
  From a seller’s point of view, eBay is attractive because it offers great flexibility 
(e.g., absolute freedom to choose sale dates, no transportation of equipment to a central 
location) and low commissions (capped at $250).  However, for tractors that sellers think 
will sell above the $20,000 limit of the eBay buyer protection program, our calculations 
suggest  that  in-person  auctions  generate  greater  total  seller  revenue,  i.e.,  the  higher 
commissions  paid  to  in-person  auctioneers  are  outstripped  by  higher  selling  prices.  
Indeed, the in-person flat commission rate that would equalize seller revenues gained 
from eBay and in-person auctions averages 55 percent, which is more than triple the 
highest commission charged by in-person auctioneers.   
  Smaller, older tractors, which commonly sell for prices less than $20,000, can 
often generate more revenue if sold on eBay.  The in-person flat commission rate that 
would equalize seller revenues gained from eBay and in-person auctions averages only   24 
29 percent across our sample of used tractors that sell for less than $20,000, while 39 
percent of the tractors that sold for less than $20,000 in our sample are predicted to 
generate more seller revenue if sold on eBay.   
In addition to informing potential used tractor market participants and providing 
insight  into  the  emerging  internet  market  for  agricultural  durable  goods  inputs,  these 
results  may  also  have  implications  for  government  statistical  agencies  that  track  the 
prices of durable equipment for purposes of productivity measurement and input index 
calculations.  If a substantial percent of farm equipment is sold on internet auction sites 
and these sites generate different price levels and hedonic price surfaces, then agencies 
must account for this heterogeneity in their data sampling methodology. 
  Our auction venue selection model confirms that larger, diesel tractors are more 
likely to be offered at in-person rather than eBay auctions, suggesting that sellers may 
already realize that in-person auctions offer better sales opportunities for these types of 
machines.  Indeed, for both the overall sample and for the sample of tractors covered by 
eBay’s buyer protection program, the predicted difference in net revenues between the 
two auction venues is a significant driver of venue selection.  We also find several state-
level attributes that drive the selection between eBay  and in-person sales.  Sellers in 
states with a higher valued stock of machinery and equipment and more frequent tractor 
sales are more likely to offer tractors for sale through an in-person auction, while sellers 
from states in which farmers report more frequent use of the internet for agricultural 
marketing purposes are more likely to offer tractors on eBay. 
Clearly additional research is necessary to help better understand the increasingly 
important  internet  marketplace.    Data  concerning  the  explicit  and  implicit  costs  and   25 
benefits that sellers and buyers attach to internet and in-person auctions is needed to 
better articulate the differences that exist between these important agricultural market 
outlets  and  the  drivers  of  observed  price  differences  between  the  two  venues.  
Furthermore,  additional  research  to  assess  ex-post  consumer  satisfaction  with  tractors 
purchased in each venue is needed to more fully explore if each venue is delivering goods 
of similar quality.   26 
Endnotes
                                                 
1 eBay also features “Buy it now”, “Fixed Price”, private, Dutch and restricted-access 
auction formats; our empirical analysis is limited to the second-price auction format.  
2 Even though the winner bidder pays more than the second-place bid, it maintains the 
key characteristic of divorcing the winning bid amount from the act of winning, which 
facilitates bidders bidding their true willingness to pay for an object.  
3 eBay provides several other instruments and policies to create trust, including escrow, 
fraud alert, protection claim, the “SquareTrade” conflict-resolution service, and explicit 
rules against certain deceptive practices (shill bidding, inappropriate bid retraction, etc.). 
4 In the selection equation, we do not have enough information to identify if the same 
seller has offered tractors to both eBay and in-person auctions; hence, a panel estimator 
approach is not pursued for the first stage of estimation. 
5 Specifically, δ[ • ] in equation (1) is replaced with λ λ λ λxi where λ λ λ λ is a row vector of 
reduced form selection parameters and xi is the column vector of tractor attributes used in 
equations (2) and (3). 
6 The random effects estimator provides an estimate of the correlation of error terms 
across related sales, which is denoted in the results as ρ.  We reject a fixed effects 
estimator because many of the seller-specific and event-specific dummy variables tend to 
be highly collinear with other dummy variables such as make, which leads to 
convergence problems.  Furthermore, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects firmly rejects the null hypothesis that the variance of the seller- and event-
specific error components equals zero for the full sample (χ
2(1) = 142.13, p < 0.0001) and 
the sample of tractors with sales price less than $20,000 (χ
2(1) =85.22, p < 0.0001).   27 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The predicted prices used in this step are merely the βj
*xi, where βj
* is the parameter 
estimate from step (b) because we now have observations for all tractors (see Maddala 
1983, pg. 237).  Also note that the difference in financial costs of selling in the two 
venues is explicitly modeled in step (c) using the commission and fees a tractor would 
accrue in each venue according to its predicted price; in step (a) these values were 
unobserved and absorbed into the intercept term. 
8 We also report estimates from equations (4) and (5) in the appendix. 
9 No qualitative results of subsequent tests between eBay and in-person price 
distributions for the John Deere 4020 change if these manual models are dropped. 
10 The upper (lower) boundary of the inner fence is determined by adding (subtracting) 
1.5 times the inter-quartile range to the 75
th (25
th) percentile. 
11 Ideally we would repeat this analysis for a popular model that typically sells for more 
than $20,000 and is traded broadly in both in-person and eBay auctions.  However, more 
expensive models tend to be newer, and fewer total units are typically produced for 
newer models.  Hence, we could not identify any single model within this data set that 
would have provided a robust test in a higher price range. 
12 Pun intended. 
13 This value and the subsequently discussed value for the number of tractors held in 
inventory by farmers in a particular state are taken from the 2002 Census of Agriculture.   28 
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Figure 1. Quadratic effects of horsepower (top panel) and age (lower panel) in full 
























































































































N = 60 N = 23  31 
Table 1. Sample of Farm Equipment Commission Structure for Full Service Auctions 
Final Selling Price  % Commission 
< $10,000  12.5% 
$10,000 to $19,999  8.4% 
$20,000 to $49,000  7.4% 
$50,000 to $99,999  6.9% 
≥ $100,000  6.4% 
Notes: An average of $450 in fixed fees are also assessed to the seller in addition to the 
calculated commission.    32 
Table 2.  Sample Summary Statistics 
    Overall  Group Means
a 
Variable   Definition  Mean  S.D.  Range  In-Person  eBay 
Price  Final sale price (U.S. $)  19,473.57  22,663.06  180 – 158,000   24278.89  8492.04 
eBay  =1 if sold on eBay  0.30  0.46  0 – 1  0.00  1.00 
Horse  Engine horsepower (100)  1.25  0.78  0.30 – 4.70  1.45  0.77 
Age  Years since date of manufacture  24.98  12.76  1 – 46  23.60  28.21 
Hours  Engine hours (1000)  4.11  2.22  0.51 – 28.34  4.44  3.35 
Implement  =1 if tractor sold with implement  0.15  0.36  0 – 1  0.10  0.28 
Diesel  =1 if engine fuel is diesel  0.88  0.32  0 – 1  0.94  0.74 
Manual  =1 if transmission is manual  0.49  0.50  0 – 1  0.44  0.59 
4WD  =1 if four-wheel drive  0.35  0.48  0 – 1  0.41  0.24 
Weekend  =1 if auction ends on weekend  0.26  0.44  0 – 1  0.25  0.30 
Jun  =1 if sold in June  0.06  0.24  0 – 1  0.05  0.07 
Jul  =1 if sold in July  0.10  0.30  0 – 1  0.10  0.07 
Aug  =1 if sold in August  0.09  0.29  0 – 1  0.09  0.11 
Sep  =1 if sold in September  0.07  0.26  0 – 1  0.07  0.09 
Oct  =1 if sold in October  0.05  0.21  0 – 1  0.03  0.09 
Nov  =1 if sold in November  0.09  0.29  0 – 1  0.09  0.10 
Dec  =1 if sold in December  0.16  0.37  0 – 1  0.18  0.11 
Jan  =1 if sold in January  0.09  0.28  0 – 1  0.07  0.12 
Feb  =1 if sold in February  0.11  0.28  0 – 1  0.11  0.10 
Mar  =1 if sold in March  0.18  0.38  0 – 1  0.20  0.14 
JD  =1 if make is John Deere  0.46  0.50  0 – 1  0.50  0.38 
IH  =1 if make is International  0.15  0.36  0 – 1  0.15  0.18 
MF  =1 if make is Massey Fergusson  0.05  0.22  0 – 1  0.03  0.10 
Ford  =1 if make is Ford  0.06  0.23  0 – 1  0.03  0.11 
CaseIH  =1 if make is Case-International  0.09  0.28  0 – 1  0.11  0.03 
Case  =1 if make is Case  0.05  0.21  0 – 1  0.05  0.04 
FNH  =1 if make is Ford-New Holland  0.03  0.16  0 – 1  0.02  0.03   33 
    Overall  Group Means
a 
Variable   Definition  Mean  S.D.  Range  In-Person  eBay 
AC  =1 if make is Allis Chalmers  0.04  0.19  0 – 1  0.03  0.04 
Oliver  =1 if make is Oliver  0.03  0.16  0 – 1  0.02  0.04 
NH  =1 if make is New Holland  0.01  0.11  0 – 1  0.01  0.02 
White  =1 if make is White  0.01  0.12  0 – 1  0.02  0.01 
Versatile  =1 if make is Versatile  0.02  0.13  0 – 1  0.03  0.00 
Belarus  =1 if make is Belarus  0.01  0.08  0 – 1  0.00  0.02 
Macval  State-level mean value of 










68.10 – 124.30   95.59  83.07 
StateSale  # tractors in data set from state 











0.48 – 2.40  1.65  1.32 
NetMarket  % of state’s farmers claiming to use 











7 – 13   10.95  10.44 
a – For all continuous variables, group means are significantly different from one another at the one percent level as determined by a 
Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test.  For all categorical (month and make) and all binary variables, groups differ from one another at 
the one percent level as determined by a Pearson χ
2 test. 
b – Data taken from 2002 Census of Agriculture for the state in which the tractor was sold, i.e., seller’s listed state of residence for 
eBay sales and state of auction for in-person sales. 
c –  Data taken from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2005).    34 
Table 3. Endogenous Switching Regression: All Tractors  
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Identify Outlet       
  Mach Value   --  --  -0.025*** 
(0.005) 























Notes: The first two columns are generalized least squares random effects (GLSRE) 
estimates of shadow values for tractor features sold at in-person auctions (column 1) and   36 
the difference between in-person and eBay shadow values (column 2).  Jackknife robust 
standard errors clustered on seller (eBay) or sales event (in-person) are reported in 
parentheses.  Maximum likelihood probit coefficients for the selection equation are 
presented in column 3 with jackknife robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denote coefficients that are statistically different from zero at the ten, five and one 
percent levels.  N=2,358.   37 
Table 4. Endogenous Switching Regression: Tractors sold for less than $20,000 
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   In-Person             eBay Interaction 
 
Prob(sold on eBay) 
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   ln(price) 
   In-Person             eBay Interaction 
 
Prob(sold on eBay) 
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Identify Outlet       
  Mach Value   --  --  -0.024*** 
(0.005) 























2      0.29 
Notes: The first two columns are generalized least squares random effects (GLSRE) 
estimates of shadow values for tractor features sold at in-person auctions (column 1) and   39 
the difference between in-person and eBay shadow values (column 2).  Jackknife robust 
standard errors clustered on seller (eBay) or sales event (in-person) are reported in 
parentheses.  Maximum likelihood probit coefficients for the selection equation are 
presented in column 3 with jackknife robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denote coefficients that are statistically different from zero at the ten, five and one 
percent levels.  N = 1,627.  40 
Table 5. Predicted Prices, Net Revenues, Equalizing Commissions and Sale Venue. 






Net Revenue:  








Full Sample Model           
           
Average of All Tractors in Full Sample  9,789  21,448  -9,795  55.2%  0.25 
Median of All Tractors in Full Sample  7,706  10,996  -2,068  31.3%  0.15 
John Deere, Diesel Manual, 2WD, 300 HP, 2,000  
  hours, 10 years old, June weekend sale 
32,737  55,132  -18,466  41.2%  0.01 
Ford-New Holland, Diesel, Automatic, 4WD, 170  
  HP, 6,000 hours, 10 years old, August Weekday 
16,468  24,875  -6,356  34.8%  0.09 
Case–International, Diesel, Automatic, 4WD, 145  
  HP, 4,600 hours, 8 years old, February weekday  
18,536  45,456  -23,367  59.8%  0.08 
           
<$20,000 Model           
Average of All Tractors in <$20,000 Sample  5,855  8,077  -872  29.2%  0.34 
Median of All Tractors in <$20,000 Sample  5,326  7,038  -489  26.1%  0.25 
Versatile, Diesel, Manual, 4WD, 7,000 hours, 280  
  HP, 25 years old, December weekday sale  
10,541  11,557  224  10.4%  0.02 
Allis Chalmers w/ loader, Gas, Manual, 2WD, 2,500   
  hours, 50 HP, 43 years old, October weekend 
3,141  2,372  1,416  NA  0.53 
International, Diesel, Manual, 2WD, 4,000 hours, 146  
  HP, 27 years old, August weekend 
6,804  9,464  -1,141  29.6%  0.07 
Notes: Prices predicted from hedonic models in table 3 (top half) and table 4 (bottom half), net revenue and equalizing flat 
commission calculations reflect commissions discussed in text, ‘NA’ reflects that eBay sales generate greater net revenue prior to 
application of relevant commissions (though not fees), probability of sale on eBay predicted using models presented in table 3 (top 
half) and table 4 (bottom half).  
 
   41 
Table 6. Probit of Structural Selection Model 
  Full Sample  < $20,000 





























2  0.18  0.16 
N  2358  1627 
Notes: Maximum likelihood probit coefficients with jackknife robust standard errors 
clustered on seller or sales event in parentheses.  Marginal effects evaluated at sample 
means are listed in brackets.  *, **, *** denote coefficients that are statistically different 
from zero at the ten, five and one percent levels. 
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Notes: Generalized least squares random effects (GLDRE) estimates of shadow values 
for tractor features sold at in-person and eBay auctions.  Jackknife robust standard errors 
clustered on seller (eBay) or sales event (in-person) are reported in parentheses.  *, **, 
*** denote coefficients that are statistically different from zero at the ten, five and one 
percent levels.   
 